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OVERVIEW 
Over the past two years, we have undertaken several studies at the Berkman Center designed to better 
understand the control of the Internet in less open societies. During the years we’ve been engaged in 
this research, we have seen many incidents that have highlighted the continuing role of the Internet as a 
battleground for political control, including partial or total Internet shutdowns in China, Iran, Egypt, 
Libya, and Syria; many hundreds of documented DDoS, hacking, and other cyber attacks against political 
sites; continued growth in the number of countries that filter the Internet; and dozens of well 
documented cases of on- and offline persecution of online dissidents.  The energy dedicated to these 
battles for control of the Internet on both the government and dissident sides indicated, if nothing else, 
that both sides think that the Internet is a critical space for political action. In this paper, we offer an 
overview of our research in the context of these changes in the methods used to control online speech, 
and some thoughts on the challenges to online speech in the immediate future. 
Both sides of the contest, those that seek to control Internet activity—typically but not exclusively 
governments—and proponents of Internet freedom, have a number of different strategies and tools at 
their disposal.  Repressive governments have a wide range of tools available to them, including 
technological approaches such as filtering, surveillance and cyber-attacks; information campaigns; and 
traditional offline methods such as the threat of legal action, physical intimidation and arrest.  For 
advocates of free speech, political and diplomatic efforts to convince governments to allow and protect 
Internet freedoms are part of a long-term strategy but ultimately rely upon governments to change their 
policies voluntarily.  In the short-term, improving technological tools designed to counter government is 
among a short list of alternatives and has therefore garnered increasing attention over the past two 
years.  Circumvention tools designed to counter government Internet filters play a prominent role in the 
clash between censors and freedom of speech advocates. Anonymity tools that aim to counteract 
surveillance and help to protect user privacy are often lumped together with circumvention tools, 
although the functional role that they serve is markedly different. Secure hosting to mitigate cyber-
attacks is another approach to resisting attempts to limit online speech. Traditional forms of popular 
advocacy seek to protect activists from arrest and detention and to prevent their disappearance when 
they are arrested.  
One of the puzzles of this field is, given the importance of the Internet as a space for political action, 
why so few people in filtered countries use circumvention tools to access blocked content.  In our 2010 
study of the usage of circumvention tools, we found that, at most, only 3% of users in countries with 
pervasive Internet filtering regularly use circumvention tools.
1
  Part of the reason that so few users use 
the tools is certainly because all of the tools suffer from trade-offs in speed, security, usability, 
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availability, and accuracy.  We evaluated 19 of these tools in 2011 and documented these trade-offs, 
including that even the fastest of the tools is a few times slower than a direct Internet connection, that 
many of the tools introduce errors in a significant portion web page requests, and that China especially 
has become much more successful at blocking many of the tools. 
An alternative explanation for relatively low use of circumvention tools is that the tools do not meet one 
of the major needs of users: creating content on local platforms for local audiences.  In our 2011 
international survey of politically-oriented bloggers, we found that, for users in filtered countries, the 
most common reason for not using circumvention tools was simply that they had no need to access 
filtered content.
2
  We also found that a majority of the surveyed bloggers perceived themselves at risk 
of arrest or persecution for posting political content. Many posted some (but not all) risky content 
anyway.  This finding suggests that projects that focus on providing unfiltered access to international 
websites are not sufficient. International platforms like YouTube, Twitter, and Facebook that allow local 
communities to interact and post content certainly play an important role in political activism in 
repressive countries.  But the most important space in this battle may not be in the firewalls between 
filtering countries and the rest of the world but rather within the local communities in the country 
where people prefer local over foreign content and daily struggle with decisions about how to self 
censor to minimize risk of offline persecution. 
Our research on Internet locality supports this suspicion. Our finding that roughly 95% of web page 
requests in China are to sites that are hosted within China bolsters the case that China's most effective 
form of Internet control has been not only shutting out foreign sites, which it cannot control directly, 
like Facebook, YouTube, and Blogger, but also fostering the growth of local sites like Baidu, QQ, and 
Youku that offer the non-political content, community, and functionality that has been the engine of the 
growth of the Internet everywhere.
3
  By spurring the growth of these local sites, China maintains the 
ability to directly regulate content on the sites while allowing its citizens to access the vast majority of 
social media content that is not politically controversial.   
There are multiple reasons Chinese users choose Youku and QQ over YouTube and Facebook. China’s 
aggressive blockage of these sites is one. The high quality of the Chinese sites and their linguistic 
accessibility to Chinese users is another. National pride and a desire to use local products may be a third. 
But the result of these intersecting factors has been the thorough segregation of the Chinese Internet 
from the rest of the world. 
Our 2011 study on the structure of national networks of autonomous systems (the Internet service 
providers, very large content providers, and other large organizations that route traffic and largely 
determine policy on the Internet) confirmed the direct, top-down control that China exerts over its 
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network.
4
  That study found that China uses only four autonomous systems (ASNs) to connect 90% of its 
240 million IP addresses (and has only 177 ASNs total) , suggesting that control of a very few 
“chokepoints” can be used to assert quite thorough Internet control.  On the other end of the spectrum, 
Russia uses 19 ASNs to connect only 30 million IP addresses (and has over 2300 ASNs total), network 
structure much more complex both absolutely and per capita.  The complexity of the network structure 
may explain why Russia has not filtered its network in the ways China has. But Russia does reportedly 
engage in a number of other forms of Internet control that reflect this more complex network structure, 
including DDoS, hacking, and other cyber attacks; on- and offline harassment of activists; and 
mobilization of youth brigades to flood online forums with pro-government views. 
Even though China and Russia differ in which forms of control they use most strongly, a common theme 
through all of our work has been that China, Russia, and all authoritarian countries we've studies use a 
diverse set of tactics to control the Internet. Our 2011 report on distributed denial of service (DDoS) 
attacks against independent media sites found that sites that experienced DDoS attacks usually 
experienced some other form of Internet control as well, such as filtering, intrusion, or defacement.
5
  
And the victims of DDoS attacks that we surveyed ranked offline persecution as more serious than 
online attacks or controls of any sort.   
Over all, our work suggests that the increasing complexity of Internet control regimes should force us to 
rethink our approaches towards empowering Internet users in less open societies. In this paper, we will 
describe in more detail the studies we have mentioned above and how they fit into this larger story 
about the diversity of tactics used by autocratic countries to control the Internet.  We will conclude by 
offering some high level recommendations for supporting the work of activists battling these forms of 
Internet control. 
CIRCUMVENTION USAGE 
In 2010, we conducted a study to estimate the number of people using circumvention tools worldwide.
6
  
We used a variety of methods to estimate usage of three different classes of tools: blocking resistant 
tools, simple web proxies, and virtual private network services. Blocking resistant tools use different 
methods to evade censorship, but all include sophisticated mechanisms that make it more difficult for a 
filtering country to block them.  This class includes three of the best known circumvention tools: Tor, 
Ultrasurf, and Freegate.  In the simple web proxy class, we included all tools that provide proxied 
Internet access through a web page interface.  Virtual private network (VPN) services provide a virtual 
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networking device on the client's computer that tunnels all of the user's network traffic through an 
encrypted tunnel to the VPN proxy.  We did not include a fourth class of tools—HTTP/SOCKS proxies—
because we have no reliable method to measure their usage. Our survey data and anecdotal reports 
suggest that use of these tools is low in comparison to other methods. 
To estimate the usage of blocking resistant tools, we either surveyed tool developers for their self-
reports of usage or, for one tool, used a previously published estimate of usage based on publicly 
available data.  For simple web proxies, we used web page traffic statistics from Google AdPlanner.  And 
for VPN services, we used web searches to compile a list of as many VPN services as we could find and 
then surveyed all of them for usage data.  Of the three classes of tools, we found the most users by far 
in the simple web proxy class of tools.  Through all methods, we estimated an upper range of about 19 
million monthly users of the three classes of tools we could measure.  Using the OpenNet Intiative's 
monitoring of national Internet filtering worldwide, we estimated 562 million Internet users in countries 
with substantial filtering. 
If we assume that all circumvention tool users are in filtered countries (which we know that they are 
not), our usage estimates indicate that at most 3% of users in all filtering countries use one of the three 
measured classes of circumvention tools. We believe the actual usage number is significantly smaller. 
Many of these tools are used by students in the US who want to avoid filters on their school’s networks 
and access Facebook, employees circumventing corporate firewalls, or users who want to access 
content not available in their country, like Hulu’s streaming video service. We believe the percentage of 
Internet users in less open societies using these tools could be as low as 1%. 
In addition to collecting data on these individual tools, we looked at Google search frequencies for 
twenty proxy or circumvention related terms in nine countries in both English and the local language.  
Through this search term frequency analysis, we found that proxy-related searches are relatively 
uncommon in all countries, that search for generic versions of the word 'proxy' were vastly more 
popular that searches for specific tools, and that there were no tools with significantly more search 
popularity than indicated by their estimated usage numbers. 
CIRCUMVENTION TOOL EVALUATION 
In February and March of 2011, we conducted an evaluation of nineteen circumvention tools, including 
simple web proxies, VPN services, and specialized tools, which we identified through a survey of 
circumvention users (described below).  That study is not yet publicly available, as we are redacting it to 
ensure we do not provide undue assistance to censorious governments. We tested the utility, speed, 
and accuracy of the tools by using testing servers in China, South Korea, Vietnam, and the United Arab 
Emirates.  For each tool in each country, we requested about 40 sites, half of which were the most 
popular general sites in the country and the other half of which were sites that were blocked within the 
country, as determined by the Open Net Initiative or Herdict projects.  We used each tool to request 
each site in each country during each of two separate rounds of tests, one in March and one in February.   
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Only two of the tools successfully passed both rounds of basic functionality tests in all countries.  Two 
other tools passed one or two tests in a single country but were incompatible with the testing setup and 
so untestable in other countries.  The rest of the tools were either badly broken (meaning they often 
failed to return a usable web page) or were blocked within at least one test in one country. In the case 
of VPN tools, this points to the limits of our testing platform, which makes it difficult to fairly evaluate 
these tools. But in the case of other tools, the results are disturbing. They contrast sharply with the 
results of a similar evaluation we conducted in 2007, in which we found that the vast majority of tools 
specifically designed for circumvention were functional and unblocked in all tested countries.  We also 
found that circumvention tools continue to create a significant speed penalty in users' browsing sessions 
and that many of the tools exhibit high error rates (up to 22%) in fetching and rendering web pages. 
These test results are consistent with reports of increasing efforts by some governments over the past 
two years to block the use of circumvention tools. 
CIRCUMVENTION USER SURVEY 
In December of 2010, we conducted a survey of politically and internationally oriented bloggers from 
eighteen countries, including fifteen that substantially filter their Internet connections.
7
  The sample of 
bloggers consisted of blogs that had been linked to by Global Voices Online (GVO), an international 
community of bloggers who report on citizen media worldwide and that had been tagged by GVO as 
being associated with one of the eighteen target countries.  Of this sample, we found that 57% of 
respondents regularly used circumvention tools, a much higher number than the 1-3% of general 
Internet users in filtered countries that we found in the circumvention usage report.  This finding was 
not surprising, however, because the sample for this survey consisted of set of people much more 
technically skilled and internationally and politically oriented than the average Internet user and, 
therefore, more likely to use circumvention tools.  Perhaps a more surprising finding was that, among 
the respondents who lived in filtering countries but did not regularly use circumvention tools, the most 
common reason for not using them was a lack of need to access filtered content. This was by far the 
most common response to a question about not using circumvention tools, rather than an inability to 
access these tools, or a lack of knowledge about using them effectively. 
The survey also asked a set of questions about users' perceptions of and reactions to the risk of online 
activism.  We found that 74% of respondents perceived some risk of detention, arrest, or criminal 
investigation in posting material critical of their governments online, and 59% perceived some risk of 
violence directed at themselves or their families.  In response to these risks of posting online, 59% of the 
respondents had chosen not to post some content online, and overwhelmingly the most common type 
of content that respondents refrained from posting was political (89% vs. religion at 31% as the next 
most common).  Of those 59% who had censored themselves due to perceived risk, 68% had posted 
some risky content. We saw no evidence of users who believed themselves to be taking a risk in using 
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circumvention tools to access content blocked locally. That finding suggests that fear of persecution for 
using circumvention tools is probably not a factor that explains their low usage. 
MAPPING LOCAL INTERNET CONTROL AND LOCALITY 
In 2010 and 2011, we analyzed the structure of national networks of autonomous systems (ASNs) to 
identify the set of ASNs that act as points of control for each national network and to compare the 
relative complexity of national ASN networks to one another.
8
  We defined the points of control for each 
country to be the smallest set of ASNs that connect 90% of the country's IP addresses.  And we defined a 
measure of complexity that assigned higher complexity to those countries with more ASNs per IP 
address and those with more IP addresses farther away from the points of control.  
We found that in almost every country, only a small subset of ASNs serve as points of control, but that 
the number of points of control and the relative complexity of national ASN networks differs 
significantly between countries.  Most strikingly, we found that China and Russia structure their network 
very differently.  In our latest analysis, using 2011 data, China had only four points of control for its 240 
million IP addresses whereas Russia had nineteen points of control for only 30 million IP addresses.  Our 
measure of complexity likewise indicated vastly different network structures in the two countries, with 
China scoring as 176 times more complex than Russia, meaning that Russia has an order of magnitude 
more ASNs per IP address than China and that these IP addresses are much more likely to be located at 
the edge of its network, away from the core points of control. 
These differing network structures reflect the different ways that China and Russia approach control of 
the Internet.  China approaches the problem from a top-down direction, starting with a national 
program of filtering its Internet connection implemented by a small set of ISPs. This control is 
complemented by nurturing large-scale national alternatives to blocked international platforms.  Russia 
uses a more decentralized approach to the problem emphasizing end-user surveillance, youth brigades 
of pro-government commenters, and easily deniable third-party denial of service attacks.  Other 
countries mix top-down and more decentralized strategies to various degrees, including Iran, which uses 
a combination of pervasive national filtering and frequent third party denial of service attacks to control 
its network.  
We extended this network mapping work to include data about the most popular websites in each 
country, as reported by Google's AdPlanner service.  We found that in both China and Russia, over 95% 
of web page visits to the most visited 250 sites in the country were to sites hosted within the given 
country.  This is an important finding for understanding Internet control in these countries because 
those locally hosted sites are subject to traditional, knock-on-door regulation. To control the content on 
a site like Baidu.com, China needs only send a government agent to the door of the person who runs the 
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site and threaten to fine, arrest, or otherwise enforce its policies, while China’s ability to control what 
appears on Facebook.com is significantly more limited. 
China's blockage of many of the big international platform sites can explain some of this high locality of 
web traffic, as can isolation through language, or cultural preferences for local services. Whatever the 
causal reason, the end effect is the same: a preference for locally hosted content makes local knock-on-
door enforcement regulation highly effective at controlling the Internet. The Russian case is even more 
interesting because Russia does not filter any of the big websites and does not exert control as directly 
over its local content providers. However, the locality of its web traffic through cultural or linguistic 
factors, makes its content publishers vulnerable to local persecution, for example, by harassment of 
sites under a law that makes publishers responsible for inflammatory content posted in discussion 
forums. 
DDOS ATTACKS AGAINST INDEPENDENT MEDIA 
Our 2010 research on distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks against independent media used four 
methods to explore the prevalence, form, and recommended response to these attacks: we conducted 
an extensive media review for reports of politically motivated DDoS attacks; we surveyed 317 
independent media organizations in nine countries; we followed up the survey with detailed technical 
interviews of operators of twelve independent media sites that had suffered from DDoS attacks; and we 
held a working meeting of technologists, independent media publishers, academics, and human rights 
organizations.
9
 
 The themes that ran through the results of all methods employed were that DDoS attacks are common 
against independent media sites, that most independent media sites suffer from an array of different 
controls in addition to DDoS attacks, and that the best defense for sites at high risk for these attacks is 
to seek protection from one of the few dozen giant companies that host services that are core to the 
modern Internet, like Google, Facebook, Amazon, Akamai and a few others. 
The media research found reports of 140 politically motivated attacks against 280 sites, and we think 
that this strongly under-reports the number of attacks taking place because we focused on English 
language media and because most attacks are not reported in the media.  Our survey found that, among 
our respondents, 81% of sites that had suffered from DDoS attacks had also suffered from at least one 
incidence of filtering, intrusion, or defacement.  And respondents to the interview ranked filtering and 
offline persecution to be bigger problems than DDoS attacks.  Follow-up technical interviews reinforced 
this finding that most sites experience of range of different on- and offline controls and that DDoS 
attacks (and filtering) are often not the most important types of controls.  From our working meeting, 
we learned that defense against DDoS attacks and other kinds of Internet controls is often very difficult 
for an independent organization, and that a key part of the solution to these attacks is connecting local 
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communities connected to independent media to the core Internet companies that have the technical 
resources to help them. 
CONCLUSIONS AND RESPONSES 
Online speech in less open societies faces a very different climate now than it did just three or four years 
ago. While national Internet filtering of web traffic has become more pervasive, this tactic may be less 
relevant than aggressive control of locally published online content. Filtering is no longer the only 
technique employed by opponents of online speech. Publishers need to worry about DDoS attacks, site 
hijacking and defacement, punitive enforcement of defamation and libel statutes, including 
intermediary liability for comments, as well as laws that prohibit dissemination of “national secrets”. 
Governments are taking unprecedented steps to control online speech, including intercepting 
passwords to social network services, as in Tunisia, and shutting down the entire Internet, as in Libya 
and Egypt.  
Our research suggests that Internet users and publishers of online content are often ill-prepared to cope 
with these shifts in Internet control. A small fraction of individuals who experience Internet filtering are 
using tools to circumvent censorship, and those tools may be less effective than in years past. And while 
new tools have emerged to help users evade censorship, there’s little hope that a technical “fix” will 
solve problems like domain name hijacking or DDoS. 
Our thinking about technological solutions to internet control has changed sharply in the face of this 
changed environment. Four years ago, we were reasonably sure that the developers of circumvention 
tools were winning the match against government censors. Not only is victory in that match less assured 
now, the entire playing field has changed, and new technologies of control are far harder to defend 
against than national internet filtering. 
While circumvention and anonymity tools are likely to continue to play an important role in digital 
activism in repressive online environments, investing disproportionate resources on technological 
solutions may be counter-productive. Increasing the performance and availability of circumvention tools 
may make it easier for a larger set of Internet users to access content that would otherwise be out of 
their reach, just as reducing the effective cost of using anonymity tools could make it safer for political 
dissidents to express themselves online and investments in more secure hosting solutions would reduce 
the vulnerability of independent media sites to malicious attack. It is unclear though how advances in 
each of these ‘liberation technologies’ might contribute to freedom of expression online or political 
reform, particularly given that none of these changes would take place in a vacuum; to the extent that 
they succeed, all of these actions will shift the benefits and costs to repressive governments of 
implementing stricter Internet controls and investing in more sophisticated counter-measures.  
Defeating government Internet filters, even if feasible, may provide the catalyst for more draconian 
government restrictions.  In such a context, it is impossible to predict whether these moves will 
ultimately increase or decrease online access to information and the ability of people to organize online.  
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In the wake of these changes, we offer five suggestions for everyone engaged in the struggle for an open 
internet. 
FOCUS ON CIRCUMVENTION TOOLS FOR ACTIVISTS. Our research suggests that it’s unrealistic to 
believe that circumvention tools will be used by a very broad audience, given a preference for local 
content in some markets and the ongoing challenges in making circumvention tools fast and easy to use. 
We believe that focusing on building highly reliable, blocking resistant tools with fast throughput for a 
small audience of users might focus the attentions of software developers more precisely. We believe 
there’s some truth to Xiao Qiang’s idea that a small set of internationally connected activists can 
disseminate information through local networks. And we worry that efforts to reach very broad 
audiences with circumvention tools is trying to solve a demand problem by focusing on supply. 
ADDRESS DDOS AND OTHER CHALLENGES. Problems like DDoS seem like ones that affect publishers, 
not internet users. But that’s the subtlety of this form of control. By disabling a site, hijacking a domain 
name or otherwise disabling a web presence, governments make content inaccessible to users around 
the world, not just users in their own countries. The tools and systems we have to respond to DDoS, site 
hijacking and other technical threats are poor, and could be vastly improved. The solution is probably 
not a purely technical one – it involves building teams of experts who can support publishers in less 
open societies with best practices, incident response and access to less vulnerable, shared platforms. 
There’s a great deal of work to be done in this space, and a few promising efforts that could benefit 
from support. 
UNDERSTAND THE TECHNIQUES NEEDED TO WIN LOCAL BATTLES. Many of the ways in which the 
Internet is controlled are highly local. While we like to pretend that the network is global and seamless, 
it’s very important to acknowledge that Chinese users use Chinese sites… and that those sites are tightly 
controlled by forces within China. When Internet traffic is local and threats to publishers are local, we 
may need fewer technical responses to Internet control, and more responses analogous to those used 
by press freedom organizations: naming and shaming, censorship indices, pressure through 
international bodies, and campaigns to protect individual dissidents. While technical solutions that 
promise liberation from these local controls are very compelling conceptually, we believe many of the 
necessary responses are the sorts of messy, ground-level human rights work that’s quite unfamiliar to 
the technical community. 
SEEK NEW ALLIES. The tools built to allow millions of users to circumvent Internet censorship have been 
built by small, poorly-resourced teams around the world. With the adoption of an “Internet Freedom 
agenda” by the US State Department, a new pool of money has appeared to support this work. But the 
most powerful potential allies in a battle for an open internet are still mostly on the sidelines. 
Companies like Google, Facebook, Amazon, Akamai, Microsoft and others have resources that could be 
marshaled to the benefit of Internet users and publishers in closed societies: bandwidth capacity that 
could support circumvention systems, DDoS-resistant hosting that could protect publishers; technical 
expertise that could fend of domain hijacking and intrusion. Helping these companies come off the 
sidelines and bringing them into the game is a key challenge for the future of free speech online. 
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MONITOR IN REAL TIME. Because the conditions for online speech are changing so rapidly, assessment 
of speech environments on an annual basis is increasingly insufficient to understand the challenges at 
hand. Our recent round of testing of circumvention tools hints at the disturbing possibility that some 
governments are periodically attempting to block traffic based on protocol and traffic pattern, 
potentially disrupting entire classes of circumvention tools. We need to develop a strategy for 
monitoring filtering, tracking DDoS and intrusion attacks and documenting assertions of local control in 
a way that is timely and ongoing to fully understand the threats to an online speech environment. 
Implementing this type of project might be a first step that involved cooperation between corporate 
actors, traditional free speech advocacy groups and the technology experts who have been tracking 
threats to free expression online. 
 
 
   
